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I. INTRODUCTION
Two companies face serious legal action that could put them out of business.
Metal-Maven, Inc., a metal fabrication company, is under contract with the
United States Air Force to fabricate specialty screws that the federal government will
use to construct a new military aircraft, the Blackbird. Pursuant to the contract,
Metal-Maven is to produce 500 sets of screws, one for each new aircraft. The
government will pay Metal-Maven $10,000 for each set. The specifications of the
contract call for Metal-Maven to use titanium, which is lighter and stronger than
steel, to fabricate the screws to be used on the aircraft. Titanium, however, is more
expensive than steel. In an attempt to maximize profit, Metal-Maven orders from a
subcontractor enough steel to produce the 500 sets of screws, instead of the agreed
upon titanium.
The steel screws prove no match for the abuse the new Blackbirds must endure,
and cause several performance issues for the Air Force. The weight of the steel
screws hinders the Blackbirds’ ability to reach desired speeds; the steel screws, very
early on, begin to rust; and, eventually, many of the screws begin to buckle under the
wind pressure caused by the high rates of speed of the Blackbirds. The United States
Attorney General, based on information brought forth by a whistle-blowing1 MetalMaven employee, files suit against Metal-Maven for defrauding the government
under the False Claims Act (“FCA”).
Reliable Rubber Manufacturers (“Reliable”) processes and produces rubber
pieces for a variety of purposes. Reliable’s most recent contract calls for it to
1
“Whistleblower” is a term often used to describe an employee, present or former, who
brings information regarding his employer’s wrongful conduct to the attention of the
government, acting as a third-party plaintiff. Similarly, “relator” is another legal term of art
describing the third-party informant involved in False Claims litigation. The term “relator,”
however, is applied to all third-party plaintiffs, not just past or present employees of the
offender. For purposes of this Note, both whistleblower and relator describe third-party
plaintiffs in False Claims Act litigation who bring information regarding the “false claims” to
the government’s attention.
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produce rubber tubing to be used on lifeboats. Lasting Lifeboats, LLC is
manufacturing 5,000 lifeboats for the United States Navy, and has subcontracted
with Reliable to produce the customized tubing; Reliable is to be compensated
$1,000 for each unique piece. The specifications for the boats, expressed in the
contracts between all three entities, call for three-quarter inch tubes.
While prudently performing its duties, Reliable noticed that its rubber-processing
machine was malfunctioning. Reliable called a licensed and highly credible machine
servicing company to repair the equipment. The machine was recalibrated and the
repairs were complete. According to the repair company, the machine was now
processing three-quarter inch rubber tubing. As far as Reliable knew, it completed
the order for the tubing according to specification and sent it off to Lasting
Lifeboats. Lasting Lifeboats affixed the rubber piece to its boats and sent them off
to the Navy. The Navy, however, quickly receives information from a third party
that the tubing measures only seven-tenths of an inch in diameter and will not be
sufficient for its purposes. As a result, the United States Attorney General files a
False Claims action against Reliable for “knowingly” defrauding the government.
At first glance, both companies appear to be on the hook for roughly $5,000,000
in damages.2 The FCA, however, imposes treble damages,3 bringing each
company’s total liability to $15,000,000. On top of that, each party may be liable for
between $5,000 and $10,000 per claim.4 If Metal-Maven submitted 500 claims for
reimbursement—one per set of screws—it could be held liable for an additional
$5,000,000. Reliable, on the other hand, presuming it filed separate claims for each
of the 5,000 lifeboats – may be held liable for an additional $50,000,000.
The False Claims Act was intended to hold parties liable, like Metal-Maven, who
purposefully defraud the government. That is, only those with the requisite scienter5
should be held liable. Attaching liability to such action has recovered billions of the
federal government’s misappropriated dollars. The FCA was not intended to attach
liability to mere negligent activity.6 Presumably, companies like Reliable will learn
their lesson through a simple negligence or breach of contract claim.

2
In Metal-Maven’s case, 500 sets of screws multiplied by its compensation, $10,000 per
set, results in $5,000,000. Reliable produced 5,000 rubber pieces at a rate of $1,000 per unit,
resulting in $5,000,000. Presumably, if sued under breach of contract, both companies would
be liable for $5,000,000 in restitution.
3

False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1) (West 2010) (stating that defendants are
liable for three times the amount of damages the government sustains because of the
defendant).
4
See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1) (West 2010); see also CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE
CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, § 7:2 (2004) (The text of the False Claims
Act sets forth “a mandatory civil penalty of ‘not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000’
for each violation of the Act.” In addition, “[u]nder the Debt Collection Improvement Act of
1996, these penalties must be adjusted for inflation every four years and are currently set at
$5,500-$11,000.”).
5
For purposes of this Note, “scienter” is a legal term of art referring to the requisite state
of mind for an offender to be found liable under the FCA.
6

See United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma Cnty. Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1421
(9th Cir. 1991).
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Attaching FCA liability in such circumstances, like Reliable Rubber’s, can
cripple entities that never intended to defraud the government. Attaching liability to
mere negligence under the FCA, although Congress denies the Act’s intention to do
so,7 carries with it a number of devastating implications for the government,
contractors, and the public as a whole. Additionally, it hardly provides for a
deterrent to mere negligence. This Note discusses this unresolved issue and focuses
on the confusion surrounding the necessary state of mind for effectuating liability
under the FCA.8
This Note analyzes Congress’s most recent attempts to recover fraudulently
secured government funds through its modifications of the False Claims Act
(“FCA”), and concludes that an amendment to the Act is necessary. To begin, Part
II.A. presents a brief historical tracking of the FCA, including the original FCA of
1863,9 and the critical amendments through 1986. Part II.B. explores relevant
interpretations by the courts that established the landscape of false claims litigation
prior to the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (“FERA”), including
Allison Engine v. United States ex. rel. Sanders, in which the United States Supreme
Court reversed a presentment requirement and articulated an intent requirement for
defendant liability.10 Part II.C. details the recent, though significant, alterations to
the FCA, including FERA’s effective overruling of Allison Engine and removal of
any intent requirement. This Note will briefly explain the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010, its erosion of the “Public Disclosure Bar,” and its
narrow definition of “publicly disclosed” information.
Part III.A. highlights current examples that demonstrate the FCA’s inevitable
shift toward a negligence standard if the Act is not further clarified. Part III.B. will
show the serious repercussions that necessarily follow such a broadened scope of
liability, such as an increased cost of doing business with the government and
contractors, and several policy implications. Finally, Part III.C. will explain that
Congress must adopt the approach of several state versions of the False Claims Act,
and expressly eliminate negligence and mistake as bases for liability under the
federal False Claims Act.

7

See 132 CONG. REC. S11244 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1986).

8

The expanded liability under the False Claims Act that is discussed in this Note is most
threatening to the health care industry. In fact, the real-world examples used in this Note’s
analysis deal with the risks posed to the health care industry. For purposes of clarity, the
hypothetical examples in the introduction of this Note involve military contracting, as the
extreme complexities involved with the health care system, including its coding procedures,
become befuddling.
The general principles, however, apply equally in all governmentcontracting settings.
9

See Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 1, 12 Stat. 696, 696-99 (1863) (current version at 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2009)).
10

See Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662 (2008).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Lincoln’s Law: The Inception of the False Claims Act
In 1863, Congress enacted Lincoln’s Law, the original False Claims Act, in
response to increasing fraud among Union contractors during the Civil War.11 In
one such example, according to the legislative history, a contractor sold and
delivered boxes of sawdust to Union cavalry, who were expecting muskets.12 The
FCA incorporated qui tam provisions—Latin for “who as well for the king as for
himself sues in this matter”13—permitting private plaintiffs, or “relators,” to bring
civil action against an FCA offender on the government’s behalf. The qui tam
provisions were introduced to greatly increase the government’s capacity to combat
fraud,14 effectively offering rewards for information to which it would not otherwise
have access.15 Qui tam provisions were especially useful at the time given that
“federal and state governments were fairly small and unable to devote significant
resources to law enforcement.”16 As the role of Government swelled, though, the
use of qui tam provisions did not subside.17 A respected scholar noted that “[t]he
war called for a dramatic escalation in the role of national government and this too
was reflected in many ways in every part of the law.”18 Specifically, the Civil War
11

ABA, Section of Public Contract Law, Procurement Fraud Committee, QUI TAM
LITIGATION UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT, 1 (2d ed. 1999); see also An Act to Prevent and
Punish Frauds upon the Government of the United States, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863)
[hereinafter “Original False Claims Act”] (As it was written in 1863, the False Claims Act
held liable any person “who shall make or cause to be made, or present or cause to be
presented for payment or approval to or by any person or officer in the civil or military service
of the United States, any claim upon or against the Government of the United States . . .
knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent.”).
12

See 132 CONG. REC. H6479, H6482 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986).

13

Qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1368 (9th ed. 2009).
14

See Note, Qui Tam Suits Under the Federal False Claims Act: Tool of the Private
Litigant in Public Actions, 67 NW. U. L. REV. 446, 453 (1972).
15

For example:
The effect of [the qui tam provision] is simply to hold out to a confederate a
strong temptation to betray his coconspirator, and bring him to justice. The bill
offers, in short, a reward to the informer who comes into court and betrays his
coconspirator, if he be such; but it is not confined to that class. . . . In short, sir,
I have based the [qui tam provisions] upon the old-fashioned idea of holding
out a temptation and “setting a rogue to catch a rogue,” which is the safest and
most expeditious way I have ever discovered of bringing rogues to justice.

CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 955-56 (1863).
16

SYLVIA, supra note 4, at § 2:6.

17

Id. (“As the role of the Government expanded, the utility of private assistance in law
enforcement did not diminish. If anything, changes in the role and size of the Government
created a greater role for this method of law enforcement.”).
18

Id. (quoting LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 295 (1973)).
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created an intense demand for war supplies, which in turn created more opportunity
for fraud.19
B. 1943 Amendments: Extinguishing the Parasites
The FCA was significantly altered only once between its inception and 1986. In
1943, several changes were made to the FCA. Among other things, the 1943
amendments bestowed upon the Department of Justice the ability to take over cases
initiated by qui tam relators.20 Furthermore, the 1943 amendments impeded qui tam
relators’ ability to bring action and reduced potential damages they may be
awarded.21 Perhaps the most momentous of the 1943 amendments required a qui
tam relator to base his suit on information that the government did not already
possess.22 In passing this amendment, Congress nullified the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, which allowed for qui tam relators
to bring “parasitical” actions based on information already made public by the
government.23 After 1943, a relator could no longer replicate the government’s
indictment by acting as a parasite to recover a portion of the damages. Here,
Congress’s intent was to prevent relators from piggy-backing on information the
government already possessed, thereby taking advantage of the qui tam provision for
personal financial gain without contributing anything to the government’s
enforcement efforts.
C. 1986 Amendments: Removing Barriers for Qui Tam Plaintiffs and the
Government
By 1986, Congress and legal scholars24 had expressed an escalating concern that
the FCA was doing too little to prevent fraud in government contracting.25 For
instance, the Department of Defense noted that, as of 1985, forty-five of the one
hundred largest defense contractors were being investigated for “multiple fraud
offenses.”26 Congress responded by demolishing many of the barriers that the 1943
revisions placed on qui tam relators.27 Consequently, relators—aptly nicknamed
“whistleblowers”—had increased incentive to bring action,28 were afforded greater
19

Id.

20

Id. at § 2:8.

21

See MICHAEL A. BRANCA, AARON P. SILBERMAN & JOHN S. VENTO, FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 728 (2d ed. 2010) (citing S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266).
22

See False Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 78-213, 57 Stat. 608, 608-09 (1943).

23

See Francis E. Purcell, Jr., Qui Tam Suits Under the False Claims Amendments Act of
1986: The Need for Clear Legislative Expression, 42 CATH. U. L. Rev. 935, 936 (1992-93)
(citing United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943)).
24

SYLVIA, supra note 4, at § 2:9.

25

See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986).

26

Id.

27

See ABA, Section of Public Contract Law, Procurement Fraud Committee, QUI TAM
LITIGATION UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT, 2-3 (2d ed. 1999).
28

Id.
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employment discrimination protection,29 were awarded higher bounties,30 and now
faced a lower burden of proof to show violation of the FCA.31 In contrast to the
1943 Amendments, whistleblowers could now bring suit even if the government
already possessed the information, provided the whistleblower was the “original
source.”32 Finally, qui tam plaintiffs were now entitled to between fifteen and thirty
percent of the government’s recovery.33 In addition, defendants were liable for
treble damages34 and a $5,000 to $10,000 fine per false claim.35
It is clear that Congress intended to revitalize the FCA through its 1986
amendments. Describing the intent behind the amendments, a representative of a
supporting business association stated that the 1986 amendments were:
supportive of improved integrity in [government] contracting. The bill
adds no new layers of bureaucracy, new regulations, or new Federal
police powers. Instead, the bill takes the sensible approach of increasing
penalties for wrongdoing, and rewarding those private individuals who
take significant personal risk to bring such wrongdoing to light.36
(emphasis added).
Furthermore, during the Senate hearings, Congressman Berman explained, “the Act
was not intended to apply to mere negligence.”37 Berman did, however, posit that
29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (West 2010); see also Purcell, supra note 23, at 936. “A
person is an original source if he had some of the information related to the claim which he
made available to the government or the news media in advance of the false claim being
publicly disclosed.” 132 CONG. REC. 29322 (1986).
33

See id.

34

To reiterate, the treble damages provision requires a court to award the plaintiff three
times the amount of actual or compensatory damages.
35

31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1) (West 2010).

36

S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 14 (1986).

37

Explaining the new FCA standard for liability, Congressman Berman stated:

It expressly acknowledges that no proof of specific intent to defraud the government is
required. There have been some erroneous court decisions that have misapplied the
law in the past to require an intent to defraud. The language defined in this section of
the law is entered to clarify what has been the law which has been properly interpreted
in the case of United States v. Cooperative Grain and Supply. Subsection 3 of Section
3729(c) uses the term “reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information”
which is no different than and has the same meaning as a gross negligence standard
that has been applied in other cases. While the Act was not intended to apply to mere
negligence, it is intended to apply in situations that could be considered gross
negligence where the submitted claims to the Government are prepared in such a
sloppy or unsupervised fashion that resulted [sic] in overcharges to the Government.
The Act is also intended not to permit artful defense counsel to require some form of
intent as an essential ingredient of proof. This section is intended to reach the
“ostrich-with-his-head-in-the-sand” problem where government contractors hide
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the amendments were “intended to apply in situations that could be considered gross
negligence where . . . claims to the Government are . . . sloppy or unsupervised.”38
D. The False Claims Act and Relevant Decisions Prior to the 2009 Amendments
Confusion has historically surrounded the False Claims Act. In its pre-2009
form, the FCA made liable any person39 that knowingly presented a false or
fraudulent claim40 or knowingly made “a false record or statement to get a false or
fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government.”41 A person, or corporation,
acted “knowingly” if that person had “actual knowledge,”42 acted in “deliberate
ignorance” of the information43, or acted in “reckless disregard of the truth or falsity
of the information.”44
1. The “Presentment Requirement”: Totten v. Bombardier Corporation
In United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., liability hinged on
Bombardier’s presentation of invoices seeking payment from an account that
contained government funds.45 Relator Totten sued Bombardier Corporation and
Envirovac, Inc., alleging violation of the FCA46 for delivering defective rail cars to
Amtrak, and submitting invoices to Amtrak for payment from a federally funded
behind the fact they were not personally aware that such overcharges may have
occurred.
132 CONG. REC. H9382 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (citation omitted). But the court’s holding in
United States v. Coop. Grain & Supply Co. seems contradictory:
Since the False Claims Act is civil in nature, the definition of “knowingly” should be
the definition as applied in the civil action of misrepresentation. Prosser classifies
misrepresentation into “the three familiar tort classifications of intent, negligence and
strict responsibility.” Since we have decided that a false claim, not only a fraudulent
claim, is actionable under the Act, a negligent misrepresentation can constitute the
necessary “knowledge.” Prosser says that “[A] representation made with a honest
belief in its truth may still be negligent because a lack of reasonable care in
ascertaining the facts.”
United States v. Coop. Grain & Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47, 60 (8th Cir. 1973) (citations
omitted).
38

132 CONG. REC. H9382 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986).

39
For purposes of this Note, a corporation is considered a “person.” See SYLVIA, supra
note 4, at § 4:70 (“Corporations are presumptively persons under the False Claims Act.”).
40

31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1) (West 1994) (amended 2009).

41

31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(2) (West 1994) (amended 2009) (emphasis added).

42

31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(1) (West 1994) (amended 2009).

43

31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(2) (West 1994) (amended 2009).

44

31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(3) (West 1994) (amended 2009).

45

United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 490 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(holding that submission of false claims to Amtrak did not constitute a violation because the
claim was not presented to the Government).
46

See id. Relator Totten brought his claim under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1).
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account.47 The D.C. Circuit held that Bombardier’s claim must be “presented to an
officer or employee of the government before liability can attach.”48 According to
the court, because Amtrak was not a government entity, Bombardier and Envirovac
had not “presented” a false claim “to the Government.”49 Consequently, liability
could not attach and Bombardier’s activity was not actionable under the FCA.50
Totten established what many have been termed the “presentment” requirement.51
2. To Get, or Not To Get: The “Intent” Requirement of Allison Engine Co. v. United
States ex rel. Sanders
Four years later, the United States Supreme Court revisited the “presentment”
requirement,52 and addressed whether an FCA defendant must intend for the
fraudulent claims to be paid by the Government.53 In Allison Engine Co. v. United
States ex rel. Sanders, the United States Navy contracted with two shipbuilders to
assemble a fleet of missile destroyers.54 The shipbuilders subcontracted with
petitioner Allison Engine to build ninety generator sets for the destroyers.55 Allison
Engine then subcontracted with petitioner General Tool to assemble the generator
sets, who, in turn, subcontracted with petitioner Southern Ohio Fabricators Company
(“SOFCO”) to make enclosures for the sets.56 The Navy specified in its contract
with the shipyards that every part produced for the destroyers was to be in strict
compliance with military standards.57 All of the Navy’s standards were expressed in
each subcontract.58

47

See id.

48

Id.

49

See id. at 491-92.

50

Id. at 493.

51

Before 1986, questions arose as to whether false claims submitted to quasigovernmental entities constituted submission of a claim to the “United States Government,”
pursuant to the False Claims Act. See, e.g., Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592
(1958) (holding that the Commodity Credit Corporation was a part of the United States
Government for purposes of the False Claims Act); United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595,
598 (1958) (holding that the Federal Housing Authority was part of the Government for
purposes of the False Claims Act); United States ex rel. Salzman v. Salant & Salant, 41 F.
Supp. 196, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) (holding that the Red Cross was not part of the Government
for purposes of the False Claims Act).
52

See Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 668-69 (2008).
Note that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in implementing the intent requirement
was unanimous.
53

Id. at 665.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 666.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.
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Ten years after the contracts were formed, two former employees of General
Tool brought suit under § 3729 of the FCA in the District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio.59 The two whistleblowers alleged that Allison Engine, General
Tool, and SOFCO submitted invoices to the shipyards that “fraudulently sought
payment for work that had not been done in accordance with contract
specifications.”60 The District Court granted the companies judgment as a matter of
law because the whistleblowers failed to show that the false or fraudulent claim was
ever presented to the Navy.61 While the Sixth Circuit agreed that “liability under §
3279(a)(1) requires proof that a false claim was presented to the Government,” it
reversed the District Court in relevant part.62 The Sixth Circuit held that claims
under § 3729(a)(2) and (3) “do not require proof of an intent to cause a false claim to
be paid by the Government,” and that “proof of intent to cause a false claim to be
paid by a private entity using Government funds was sufficient.”63
The United States Supreme Court reversed.64 First, the Court implicitly
overturned Totten and found that the claim need not be presented directly to the
government.65 The Court held, however, that the false statement must be made with
the intention that it will be relied upon by the government in paying, or approving
payment of, a claim.66 A subcontractor is not liable for submitting false claims to a
prime contractor, unless the subcontractor does so with the intent that the claim is to
be paid by the federal government.67
In its analysis, the Court marshaled the specific language of § 3729(a)(2),
holding that “to get” a false claim paid “by the Government” indicated an intent
requirement.68 In other words, the mere fact that government funds were used was
insufficient to attach liability. Rather, the false claim must intend to defraud the
government. The Court reasoned that, without such a requirement, the FCA would
become “an all-purpose anti-fraud statute.”69 Moreover, “[e]liminating this element

59

Id.

60

Id. at 667.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 667-68. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that liability under §
3729(a)(1) requires proof that the claim was presented to the government. The appellate
court, however, held that § 3729(a)(2) and (3) did not require intent to defraud to attach
liability.
63

Id. at 668.

64

Id. at 673.

65

Id. at 672.

66

Id. at 672-73.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 668 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (1986), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-21, §
4(a)(1), 123 Stat. 1617, 1622 (2009)).
69

Id. at 672.
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of intent . . . would expand the FCA well beyond its intended role of combating
‘fraud against the Government.’”70
E. The Fraud Enforcement & Recovery Act of 2009: “Clarifications to the False
Claims Act”
In May of 2009, President Obama signed into effect the Fraud Enforcement and
Recovery Act of 2009 (“FERA”),71 its primary purpose being to address the current
crises of financial institution fraud and fraud against federal relief programs. In the
process, FERA slipped several crucial amendments to the FCA into the bill.72 For
instance, FERA overruled Allison Engine’s intent requirement. In relevant part,73
FERA set out to “clarify” portions of the False Claims Act (“FCA”), the act
originally enacted as the government’s response to abuses by private supply
contractors during the Civil War.74 While FERA made numerous adjustments to the
FCA, this Note primarily focuses on FERA’s removal of the so-called “intent”
requirement,75 FERA’s expansion of liability under the “reverse false claims”
provision, and the FCA’s inevitable trend toward a negligence standard.
1. Congress’ Removal of Allison Engine’s “Intent” Requirement
As mentioned above, the Court in Allison Engine held that “to get” a claim paid
by the Government denotes purpose and intent.76 In response to the Supreme
Court’s holding in Allison Engine, Congress amended the language in § 3729(a)(2)
of the FCA.77 Congress removed the “to get” language, and now requires only that
70

Id. at 669 (quoting Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592 (1958)) (emphasis in
Allison Engine).
71

Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009).

72

See id.

73

See generally, S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10-12 (2009). The Fraud Enforcement and
Recovery Act of 2009 amended, inter alia, a fraud statute to protect funds under the Troubled
Asset Relief Program and economic stimulus package, the federal securities statute, and the
federal money laundering statutes. For purposes of this Note, however, only the amendments
to the False Claims Act are relevant.
74

J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 555 (2000).
75
31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (West 2010). As originally enacted in 1863, this section
imposed liability on a person “who shall, for the purpose of obtaining, or aiding in obtaining,
the approval or payment of such claim, make, use, or cause to be made or used, any false bill,
receipt, voucher, entry, roll, account, claim, statement, certificate, affidavit, or deposition,
knowing the same to contain any false or fraudulent statement or entry.” Act of Mar. 2, 1863,
§ 1, 12 Stat. 696, 697. Congress later eliminated a number of the references to the various
types of records or statements for consistency with other sections of the Code. See Pub. L. No.
97-258, 96 Stat. 978 (1982); H.R. REP. NO. 97-651 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1895, 2037. In 2009, Congress eliminated the references to getting a claim paid, or the
purpose of the record. Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009).
76

See supra Part II.D.2.

77

Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617
(2009).
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the false record or statement be “material to” the false or fraudulent claim.78
Similarly, Congress further “clarified” the FCA by officially ridding the statute of
any language that might indicate a “presentment” requirement.79 Congress defined
the term “material” to mean “having a natural tendency to influence, or being
capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.”80
To cap things off, FERA modified the FCA’s definition of “claim,” which now
reads, “any request or demand . . . for money or property . . . whether or not the
United States has title to the money or property . . . if the money or property is to be
spent or used on the government’s behalf or to advance a government program or
interest.”81 In sum, liability may now attach even when FCA defendants neither
present a false claim directly to the government, nor present a false claim with the
intent of defrauding the government.82
2. FERA’s Expansion of the “Reverse False Claims” Provision of the FCA
A whistleblower also has the so-called “reverse false claims” provision of the
False Claims Act at its disposal.83 A reverse false claim, post-FERA, transpires
when an entity “knowingly” makes a false statement to avoid or decrease an
“obligation” to pay the Government, as opposed to making false statements to
increase the amount of money it receives from the Government.84 An “obligation,” a
term previously interpreted by the courts, now means “an established duty, whether
or not fixed, arising from an express or implied contractual . . . relationship . . . or
from the retention of any overpayment.”85 Thus, the “reverse false claims” provision

78

S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 12 (2009) (“To correct the Allison Engine decision . . . [i]n
section 3729(a)(2) the words ‘to get’ were removed striking the language the Supreme Court
found created an intent requirement for false claims liability under that section.”).
79

Id. (“[T]he language ‘paid or approved by the Government’ was removed to address
both the decision in Allison Engine, and to prevent a new ‘presentment’ requirement from
being read into the section.”).
80
Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2009)). Contra United States ex rel. Conner v.
Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., 543 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2008) (applying a much narrower
definition of “materiality” than the definition provided by FERA).
81

Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(a)(2), 123 Stat. 1617, 1621 (2009).

82

See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (West 2010).

83

See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (West 2010) (formerly codified as 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(7)).
84
Id. Prior to the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, the “reverse false
claims” provision held liable any person that “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or
used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit
money or property to the Government.” Upon enactment of FERA, the provision holds liable
any person who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government,
or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay
or transmit money or property to the Government.” (emphasis added).
85

31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(3) (West 2010).
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now attaches liability to potential or contingent duties to repay,86 not just those
previously fixed or determined.87
In addition, an affirmative statement88 is no longer necessary to invoke liability
under the “reverse false claims” provision because it now makes liable any person
who “knowingly conceals or . . . avoids or decreases an obligation to pay.”89 As a
result, merely retaining an overpayment, without more, could presumably lead not
only to the obligation to restore the Government to its original position, but could
also trigger treble damages and penalties. At the very least, FERA’s ambiguous
definition of “obligation” prompts the question: When can an “established duty”
arise from “retention of an overpayment,” other than from “a contractual, grantorgrantee, licensor-licensee, fee-based or similar relationship, or a statute or a
regulation”?90 Because whistleblowers no longer need to prove an affirmative act
for a defendant to be subject to FCA liability, FERA will necessarily open the door
to more fruitless, wasteful litigation. In addition, these changes further exemplify
the FCA’s shift toward a negligence standard of liability.
F. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
In another effort to reverse the judicial trend of limiting qui tam actions under the
FCA, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (“PPACA”) in March of 2010.91 Of chief importance is the PPACA’s erosion of
the “Public Disclosure Bar.”92 The FCA now reads that “the Court shall dismiss an
action or claim under this section, unless opposed by the Government, if

86
S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 14 (2009) (“The term ‘obligation’ is now defined under new
Section 3729(b)(3) and includes fixed and contingent duties owed to the Government–
including fixed liquidated obligations such as judgments, and fixed, unliquidated obligations
such as tariffs on imported goods.”) (emphasis added).
87

See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marcy v. Rowan Co., 520 F.3d 384, 391 (5th Cir. 2008);
U.S. ex rel. Bain v. Ga. Gulf Corp., 386 F.3d 648, 657 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Bourseau, 531 F.3d 1159, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to interpret “obligation” to
include potential or contingent obligations, requiring instead that the obligation be fixed at the
time of the allegedly false claim).
88
See Robert T. Rhoad & Matthew T. Fornataro, A Gathering Storm: The New False
Claims Act Amendments and Their Impact on Healthcare Fraud Enforcement, 21 HEALTH
LAW. 14, 18 (2009) (noting that the Senate Judiciary Committee on FERA states that the
revised provision is aimed at imposing liability “without notice [by the provider] to the
Government about the overpayment” (quoting S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 15 (2009)).
89

31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (West 2010).

90

See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(3) (West 2010).

91

See Brian G. Santo, The False Claims Act: Analysis of the Recently Expanded
Legislation on Qui Tam Actions and Related Impact on Whistleblowers, ABA HEALTH
(July
2010),
ESOURCE
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/aba_health_esource_home/Volume6_SE
2_Santo.html (citing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010)).
92

See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
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substantially the same allegations or transactions alleged in the action or claim were
publicly disclosed.”93
In tandem with the Court’s new standard of discretion, the amended FCA
employs a narrower definition of “publicly disclosed” information.94 The FCA now
only bars actions brought in response to disclosures by federal sources or the media,
leaving open the possibility of parasitic actions based on state or local publications.95
The “original source” exception to the public disclosure bar, as previously
mentioned,96 has even been expanded.97 Instead of requiring a whistleblower to
provide “direct and independent knowledge” of allegedly fraudulent activity,98 the
FCA now merely requires a whistleblower to contain “knowledge that is
independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations.”99 By
narrowing the FCA’s definition of “publicly disclosed” information and relaxing its
definition of “original source,” the PPACA corrodes the “public disclosure bar.” As
a result, more qui tam relators are able to bring suits under the FCA, which
contributes to the FCA’s widened scope of liability.
Currently, the FCA establishes liability when any person or entity improperly
receives funds from, or avoids payment to, the Federal government.100 In short, the
FCA prohibits a contractor from: (1) knowingly presenting, or causing the
presentation of a false claim for payment or approval; (2) knowingly making, or
causing to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or
fraudulent claim; (3) conspiring to commit any violation of the FCA; (4) falsely
certifying the type or amount of property to be used by the Government; (5)
certifying receipt of property on a document without complete knowledge of the
information’s truth; (6) knowingly buying Government property from an officer not
under Government authorization, and; (7) knowingly making, using, or causing to be
made or used a false record to avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or relinquish
property to the Government.101

93

31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (West 2010).

94

31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(ii) (West 2010).

95

31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(iii) (West 2010).

96

See supra Part II.B.

97

See Santo, supra note 91 (citing False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (West
2010)).
98

31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (West 2009) amended by 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(B)
(West 2010).
99

31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (West 2010).

100

See generally 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (West 2010).

101

31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A)-(G) (West 2010).
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III. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT’S SHIFT TOWARD A NEGLIGENCE STANDARD: THE
INEVITABLE ESCALATION OF TRANSACTIONAL COSTS AND NECESSARY CHANGES
A. The False Claims Act and its Shift Toward a Negligence Standard
With FERA’s removal of Allison Engine’s intent requirement,102 the standard for
liability under the False Claims Act resembles one of negligence. Negligence
employs a standard of care based upon the conduct of a “reasonable man of ordinary
prudence.”103 Under a standard of negligence, an actor is expected to do the
reasonable thing under the circumstances.104 The standard of conduct applied is an
objective one, contrary to the subjective standard applied to intentional conduct.105
In short, an actor or entity is negligent if: (1) the actor or entity owes a legal duty; (2)
breaches that duty by falling below a reasonable standard of care; (3) there exists a
causal connection between the conduct and the injury; and (4) the conduct results in
actual loss or damage to another.106
To reiterate, the FCA only requires that a false claim be “material to” the
government’s decision to approve payment,107 and “require[s] no proof of specific
intent to defraud.”108 Congress developed the FERA “clarifications” of the FCA to
halt the “types of fraud the FCA was intended to reach when it was amended in
1986.”109 These “clarifications” are not without benefits; many false or fraudulent
statements deserve recourse “without regard to whether the wrongdoer deals directly
with the Federal Government . . . or with a third party contractor.”110 Congress’s
motives, while well-intentioned, are shortsighted. Under the FERA “clarifications,”
liability may attach without regard to whether the defendant is an intentional
“wrongdoer”111 in the first place. Moreover, it appears that merely negligent
defendants are now subject to liability under the amended FCA.
102

See supra Part II.E.1.

103

PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 174 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed.
1984). Authored and often reedited by the late Dean Prosser and the late Professor Keeton,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS has widely been recognized as the leading work on
the subject of tort law.
104

Id. at 173-74.

105

Id.

106

Id. at 164-65.

107

31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (West 2010); see also 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (West
2010) (attaching liability when statement is “material to an obligation to pay or transmit
money or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly
avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government . .
.”) (emphasis added).
108

31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(1)(B) (West 2010).

109

S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 11 (2009).

110

Id.

111

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “wrongful” as “[c]haracterized by unfairness or
injustice . . . [c]ontrary to law; unlawful . . . .” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1751 (9th ed.
2009).
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1. Negligent Compliance and Voluntary Disclosure
The Mayo Foundation (“Mayo”) is a current example of a negligent FCA
defendant.112 Although negligent, Mayo is not necessarily a wrongdoer, and has not
acted with any intent to defraud. In September 2010, the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) intervened in a false claims action against Mayo pertaining to billing for
services that were allegedly never performed.113 The whistleblowers that initiated
the complaint are comprised of patients and family members.114 The government
has intervened despite the fact that “Mayo says it refunded the government’s money
three years ago before the organization even knew the lawsuit was in the works.”115
In particular, the complaint alleges that, over the duration of 10 years, Mayo
billed Medicare when it “prepared and examined water-based, blue-stained frozen
slides”116 for pathology purposes. Mayo also billed Medicare for the preparation,
examination, and reports of “unfrozen slides,” which, according to the
whistleblowers, Mayo never performed.117 For instance, the deceased wife of one of
the whistleblowers underwent gallbladder surgery at Mayo Clinic in 1999. “Mayo
billed Medicare for both a frozen section pathology exam under surgical pathology
code 88331-26 and for the preparation of an unfrozen permanent section slide . . . the
examination of the unfrozen permanent section slide and the preparation of a report
for such examination under surgical pathology code 88304-26.”118 Mayo’s records
indicate the billing of both, even though “Code 88304-26 specifically excludes a
frozen section exam from its definition. . . .”119
Similar to the Reliable Rubber example,120 it appears as if Mayo’s unnecessary
billing was merely a result of negligent compliance. Although Mayo volunteered the
information, it may have simply fallen below the reasonable standard of care in its
coding efforts. At most, Mayo is in breach of a contractual obligation. In Mayo’s
defense, complex coding and billing procedures often result in billing errors. The
practice of medicine, for example, “more than ever before, places greater demands
on physicians to see more patients, provide more complex medical services and

112

See Complaint, United States ex rel. Ketroser v. Mayo Found., Case No. 07-SC-4676
RHK (AJB) (D. Minn. Feb. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Mayo Found.] (on file with author).
Relators Ketroser, Latz, Smith, and Kennedy filed this complaint in 2008. In September of
2010, the Department of Justice decided to intervene in this qui tam action. See Youngstrom,
infra note 113.
113
See Nina Youngstrom, Feds Join Lawsuit Against Mayo Foundation Despite its
Voluntary Medicare Refund Years Ago, AIS’S HEALTH BUSINESS DAILY (Oct. 26, 2010, 11:06
AM) (on file with author).
114

See Mayo Found., supra note 112, at 2.

115

Youngstrom, supra note 113, at 1.

116

Id. at 2 (Presumably, the slides were used, among other things, to diagnose and treat the
patient.); see also Mayo Found., supra note 112, at 16-17.
117

Youngstrom, supra note 113, at 2.

118

Mayo Found., supra note 112, at 17 (emphasis added).

119

Id. (emphasis added).

120

See supra Part I.
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adhere to stricter regulatory rules, leaving little time for coding and billing.”121
Among the most common errors are “[b]illing for items or services not provided . . .
. [d]ouble billing for the same service or item . . . .” and “[u]pcoding the level of
service provided.”122 In addition, not all of these billing errors result in the overcompensation of physicians. Both health care and business analysts alike reveal
“that physicians may not be receiving their fair share of health care dollars.”123 The
American Medical Association states that declining reimbursements are “the
dilemma facing many doctors today who have overhead costs that are going up faster
than their revenue.”124
A Mayo spokesperson responded to the allegations by stating “that Mayo
officials discovered a billing error in 2007, corrected it and voluntarily refunded
$242,711 to the government.”125 In addition, “[t]he error was identified and
corrected long before Mayo was aware that a sealed complaint126 had been filed and
before Mayo was notified that the Department of Justice was evaluating whether to
become involved in the complaint[.]”127 Since Mayo discovered the misstep
internally and voluntarily returned the money to the government, it would appear
that the government did not suffer injury. Even so, according to Ed Gaines, attorney
and compliance specialist,128 “if you don’t go through the protocol, you don’t trump
the ‘whistleblower effect[.]’”129 What is more, by failing to comply with voluntary
self-disclosure protocol, Mayo will not be considered the original source of the
blunder.130
Mayo independently discovered and voluntarily disclosed the false information.
Thus, it necessarily follows that Mayo did not act with the requisite “scienter” that
the FCA set out to prohibit.131 In this case, it appears that mere negligence – a
121

Diane L. Adams, Helen Norman & Valentine J. Burroughs, Addressing Medical Coding
and Billing, Part II: A Strategy for Achieving Compliance, a Risk Management Approach for
Reducing Coding and Billing Errors, 94, J. NAT’L MED. ASSOC. 430, 430. (June 2002).
122

Id. at 434.

123

Id. at 430.

124
Julie A. Jacob, Losing Proposition: When Doctors Take In Less Than What Goes Out,
AM. MED. NEWS,
Jan.
7,
2002,
available
at
http://www.ama-assn.org/
amednews/2002/01/07/bisa0107.htm.
125
Youngstrom, supra note 113, at 2 (emphasis added) (The Mayo spokesperson further
stated that, “[t]he error was identified and corrected long before Mayo was aware that a sealed
complaint had been filed and before Mayo was notified that the Department of Justice was
evaluating whether to become involved in the Complaint.”).
126
See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(b)(2) (West 2010) (“A copy of the complaint and written
disclosure . . . shall be served on the Government . . . [.] The complaint shall . . . remain under
seal for at least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders.”).
127

Youngstrom, supra note 113, at 2-3.

128

See id. at 2 (According to the article, Ed Gaines is the “chief compliance officer for
Medical Management Professionals in North Carolina.”).
129

Id. at 3.

130

See id. at 3-4.

131

See supra Part I.
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breach of Mayo’s duty to comply with disclosure protocol – may result in liability
under the unfastened provisions of the FCA.
2. Reasonable Belief of Compliance
Without an intent requirement, courts may attach liability in situations where
defendants reasonably believed they were compliant.132 In United States v. Chen,
the court held defendant Dr. Chen liable under § 3729 of the False Claims Act.133
The government alleged that the anesthesiologist and critical care expert knowingly
fabricated “consultations” and submitted claims to Medicare for reimbursement.134
At first glance, Dr. Chen’s situation appears to be the most typical form of a false
claim allegation: one where the “defendant charged the government for more than
was provided.”135 Unfortunately for Dr. Chen, what constitutes a “consultation” is
confusing136 because there is no statutory or regulatory definition of the term.137
Consequently, physicians often have trouble determining how to bill a consultation.
For nearly five years, Dr. Chen billed Medicare for his consultations in the same
manner.138 Medicare reimbursed him each time, thereby affirming that he was in
compliance with Medicare billing practices.139 Specifically, Dr. Chen billed for
catheterization, the area in which he specializes, and a consult on the same patient
performed on the same day.140 The Unites States contended that the referring
physicians did not request consultations or that Chen did not perform “separately
identifiable services.”141 Each of the thirty-seven referring physicians, however,
stated that he or she “requested a ‘consult’ from Dr. Chen.”142 But in most instances,
the referring physicians requested Dr. Chen to perform catheter procedures, and did
132

See generally United States v. Chen, 402 F. App’x 185 (9th Cir. 2010).

133

See generally id.

134

Id. at 187.

135

SYLVIA, supra note 4, at § 4:16 (noting that “[c]ongressional committees investigating
fraud against the government prior to the adoption of the False Claims Act in 1863 reviewed
countless examples of this type of conduct”).
136

United States v. Chen, 2:04-cv-00859-PMP-PAL, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35845, at *56, aff’d (D. Nev. May 30, 2006). The district court admitted that “this case involves
regulations that . . . [are] unquestionably technical . . . [and] [t]heir meaning is ultimately the
subject of judicial interpretation.” Id. at *23 (quoting United States ex rel. Oliver v. Parsons
Co., 195 F.3d 457, 463 (9th Cir. 1999)). See also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944).
137

Medicare’s best attempt to explain what might constitute a consultation is “a type of
service provided by a physician whose opinion or advice regarding evaluation and/or
management of a specific problem is requested by another physician.” Chen, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 35845, at *5-6.
138

See id. at *8-9. (Dr. Chen was sued for 3,544 claims made between January 1, 1999 and
June 21, 2004.).
139

Id. at *9-11.

140

Id. at *8.

141

Id. at *24.

142

Id. at *16.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss2/8

18

2012]

THE CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT

551

not expressly ask for Dr. Chen’s opinion or advice.143 Therefore, the court found
that, “[a]lthough every referring doctor has testified that he requested a
‘consultation,’ none has testified that he requested a consultation as defined by
Medicare supporting Dr. Den’s billing of CPT Code 99255.”144
Dr. Chen’s belief that he was in compliance with Medicare, and the FCA,
seemed reasonable. The term “consultation” is not precisely defined, and each
referring physician stated that they both requested, and Dr. Chen performed, a
consultation.145 Even if Dr. Chen’s belief was unreasonable, and he knowingly
submitted false claims, Medicare compensated him for years without issue.146 If
Medicare affirmed Dr. Chen’s practices by continued reimbursement, he was
submitting subsequent claims in good faith. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s statement that
an FCA defendant can escape liability “not because [his] interpretation was correct
or ‘reasonable’ but because the good faith nature of [his] action forecloses the
possibility that the scienter requirement is met”147 seems like lip service. In no way
did Dr. Chen act with the intention to injure the government. Even more so, Dr.
Chen’s actions were neither deceptive nor wrongful. Even if Dr. Chen acted
unreasonably by Medicare standards, he lacked the requisite scienter intended under
the FCA. Because there are other methods of recourse, the FCA should only sink its
teeth into intentional, wrongful, or deceptive claims.
3. Negligent Returns of Government Overpayments
After the enactment of FERA and PPACA, health care organizations risk severe
sanctions under the reverse false claims provision.148 Where government programs –
most notably federal healthcare programs like Medicare and Medicaid – make
erroneous overpayments to a contractor, the burden soon shifts to the contractor to
recognize and reconcile the government’s blunder. In the health care field,
“overpayments” include “any funds that a person receives or retains . . . to which the
person, after applicable reconciliation, is not entitled.”149 After the overpayment is
“identified,” contractors have a mere sixty days to report and return the erroneously
rationed funds.150 Should a negligent oversight on the part of the contractor result in
retention of these funds for longer than sixty days, the contractor faces treble
damages.151 Furthermore, § 6402 of the PPACA legislation asserts that an
143

Id. at *24.

144

Id. at *24-25 (emphasis added).

145

Id. at *5-6.

146

Id. at *9-11.

147

United States v. Chen, 402 F. App’x 185, 188 (9th Cir. 2010). (citing United States ex.
rel. Oliver v. Parsons Co., 195 F.3d 457, 464 (9th Cir. 1999)).
148

See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.

149

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009), Pub. L. No.
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
150
Id. The provider must report and return a Medicare or Medicaid overpayment within
sixty days of identification of the overpayment or the date the corresponding cost report is
due, whichever is later. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402(a).
151

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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overpayment retained after sixty days establishes an “obligation” under the FCA,
thus exposing a provider to penalties of up to $10,000 per claim.152 Thus, even
“retaining reimbursement received in good faith but later determined to be improper,
such as the reimbursement for services provided pursuant to a referral prohibited by
[federal law], could give rise to FCA liability.”153
Compounding the confusion, the PPACA neglects to define the term
“identified.”154 Must the contractor have actual knowledge of the overpayment?
Will a reckless disregard for the identification of the overpayment suffice? As such,
“what constitutes an ‘identified’ overpayment is, at this point, unknown and likely to
be the subject of significant litigation, unless sufficiently clarified by an agency
rulemaking.”155 Navigating the murky waters of the FCA, along with other
regulatory provisions, in order to determine when repayment obligations might exist
is a daunting task. In the healthcare context, the Fourth Circuit noted:
There can be no doubt but that the statutes and provisions in question,
involving the financing of Medicare and Medicaid, are among the most
completely impenetrable texts within human experience. Indeed, one
approaches them at the level of specificity herein demanded with dread,
for not only are they dense reading of the most tortuous kind, but
Congress also revisits the area frequently, generously cutting and pruning
in the process and making any solid grasp of the matters addressed merely
a passing phase.156
What has become increasingly clear, however, is that contractors face potentially
crippling consequences under the modernized FCA without any intent to defraud the
government.
a. What Constitutes an “Obligation”?
After FERA’s enactment, the FCA attaches liability if there is an “obligation” to
repay overpayments that are possessed “knowingly” and “improperly.”157 FERA
“defines an ‘obligation’ as ‘an established duty, whether or not fixed’ arising from
an express or implied contractual, grantor-grantee, or licensor-licensee relationship,
from a fee-based or similar relationship, from statute or regulation, or from the
retention of any overpayment.”158 Further complicating the matter is the fact that an
affirmative statement or claim is no longer necessary to trigger liability.159 The new
152

Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402, 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a) (West 2010).
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Robert G. Homchick, Lisa R. Hayward & David V. Marshall, FERA and the New World
of False Claims Act Risks: Hypotheticals Help Illustrate What Constitutes “Knowing and
Proper,” 12 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 5, 8 (2010).
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Neely S. Griffith & Mollye M. Demosthenidy, Provider Uncertainties in the Refund of
Overpayments, ABA HEALTH ESOURCE (June 2010) (on file with author).
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Rehab. Ass’n of Va. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1450 (4th Cir. 1994).
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31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (West 2010).
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definition of “obligation” can cause considerable confusion in the health care
industry because “identifying and confirming a potential legal duty to repay an
overpayment in the health care regulatory scheme is no simple task.”160
FERA does not elaborate on what constitutes an “established duty.”161 FERA’s
legislative history does indicate, however, that Congress did not intend for a
“contingent” obligation to fall within the purview of the FCA.162 Unfortunately,
FERA’s definition of “obligation” has yet to be interpreted by the courts in many
contexts. Instead, contractors linger at the sufferance of the courts’ interpretation of
exceedingly vague language, and correspondingly perplexing regulatory law. As a
result, contractors remain subject to arbitrary, paralyzing penalties for seemingly
negligent activity.
b. When are Funds “Improperly” Retained?
Another question that government contractors are forced to grapple with is
whether or not funds have been “improperly” retained. An example of this
confusion can be illustrated through a hypothetical situation.163
Athlete
Rehabilitation Center (“the Center”) contracts with Orthopedic Professional
Physicians (“the Physicians”) to staff the Center’s orthopedic surgery department
(“OSD”). The Center bills for both the OSD facility fees and the physicians’
specialized services. The physicians are revered among their orthopedic surgeon
colleagues, and widely considered to be the most skilled coalition in their profession.
The quality of the physicians’ work performed in the OSD is among the highest in
the nation, and the Center has received widespread praise.
The physicians, however, have not reached the same level of mastery in
meticulously maintaining accurate documentation of services provided. The Center
recently conducted an internal audit, revealing that documentation for thirty-five
percent of the claims submitted for orthopedic services (whether facility or
professional components) contained deficiencies. While the severity of the
respective documentation deficiencies varied from claim to claim, the audit results
confirmed that all services were, in fact, performed. To ensure that these problems
do not occur again in the future, the Center provides documentation and coding
training to the physicians. Given the unclear language implemented by the FERA
amendments to the FCA, it is not clear whether the Center has “knowingly and
improperly” retained overpayments.
A whistleblower privy to the deficient documentation may bring an action by
arguing that the documentation errors make the claims “improper.” If the
whistleblower succeeds in its argument, it may show that the reimbursement the
Center received for the properly rendered services constitutes an “overpayment,”
thereby exposing the Center to FCA liability. In this situation, the physicians
performed superlatively, simply falling below a reasonable standard of care in
documenting such services. It is not even clear that the documentation oversights
resulted in the Center or the physicians being overpaid. More importantly, neither
the physicians nor the Center acted with intent to defraud the government.
160
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Additionally, after an internal audit, the Center took steps to correct the problem by
implementing a training program for the physicians. Consequently, imposing heavy
damages and excessive penalties for a negligent compliance with overly vague
provisions is illogical and will yield counterintuitive results.
c. What Does it Mean to Have “Identified” an Overpayment?
Confusion also surrounds the issue of what it means to have “identified” an
overpayment. Recall that, under the PPACA, a health care contractor is required to
report and return any overpayment of Medicare or Medicaid funds no later than sixty
days after the overpayment has been “identified.”164 The PPACA fails to elaborate
as to when an overpayment has been “identified.” Of chief concern is what state of
mind is required to “identify” an overpayment. For example, must the contractor
have actual knowledge of the overpayment, or is “information that reasonably
suggests there has been an overpayment” sufficient?165 Because it is unclear what
constitutes identification of an overpayment, it is necessarily unclear when the sixty
day limitation provided by the PPACA begins to run. Consequently, it becomes
increasingly difficult for health care organizations to avoid FCA liability through
timely reports and returns of uncertain “overpayments.”
B. Raising the Cost of Doing Business with Both Contractors and the Government
Exposing companies to increased liability necessarily raises the price of doing
business with those companies and the federal government. To combat the risk of
liability, companies are forced to allocate additional resources in several areas;
namely, compliance, arbitration, litigation, settlement negotiations, and the time
necessary to research these situations.166
In disputes involving complex
presumptions of liability, expenditures for legal counsel can range between one and
ten million dollars, sometimes more.167 Smaller firms, similar to the hypothetical
Reliable Rubber,168 may not have the means to guard against FCA allegations or to
“implement expansive compliance systems.”169
Cases where the government declines to intervene have proven particularly
burdensome on companies and contractors, resulting in company expenditures
disproportionate to the relators’ recovery.170 A study of thirty-eight cases shows that
when whistleblowers chose to go at it alone, the average recovery was a mere
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$97,223, compared to an average cost to defend the action of $1,431,660.171 Even
more striking is the fact that, as of 2009, the government declined to intervene in
more than two-thirds of the cases.172 Of those two-thirds, a majority of the cases
were dismissed, “incurring costs for the parties without benefitting the public.”173
Even more striking is the fact that courts may award penalties even absent any
financial loss to the government. In United States ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse
Savannah River Company, the district court awarded civil penalties of $195,000 and
attorney’s fees totaling more than $144,000 even though the relator failed to prove
the government incurred an actual loss.174 The defendant neglected to divulge a
conflict of interest when seeking a contract with the Department of Energy, but the
misrepresentation resulted in no loss to the government.175 Instead, the Fourth
Circuit attached liability on the ground that misrepresentation had “negatively
affected the integrity of the bidding process.”176 Logically, these companies and
contractors are forced to raise prices in order to subsidize the increased costs of
fruitless litigation.177
Similarly, the increase in FCA litigation also heightens the cost of doing business
with the government.178 Proponents of expanded FCA liability validly point out that
“the costs of defending against unsuccessful qui tam suits are recoverable against the
government.”179 In other words, in the case of dismissal or a victory for the defense,
the defendant can recover the cost of the litigation. In many instances, however, the
government has reimbursed the defendant in excess of what the whistleblower stood
to gain on his own.180 As a result, a survey suggests that the Department of Defense
171
See Daniel C. Lumm, The 2009 “Clarifications” to the False Claims Act of 1863: The
All-Purpose Antifraud Statute with the Fun Qui Tam Twist, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 527, 537
(2010).
172

U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE CIVIL DIV., FRAUD STATISTICS, QUI TAM INTERVENTION DECISIONS &
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6,628 cases, with nearly 1,000 still under investigation. Id.
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spends significantly more in reimbursing contractor defendants than the government
recovers under the FCA in like situations.181 It is undisputed that the FCA, in many
instances, is an effective and necessary weapon in combating fraud against the
government.182 The FCA, however, can be a more efficient tool if its focus is
narrowed to exclude negligence as a basis for liability.
C. Implicit Negligence Standard Causes Other Policy Implications and
Unwarranted Burdens
The wrath of the vast FCA does not limit itself to smaller organizations. Boeing,
for example, is the largest United States exporter in terms of value, and is the third
largest defense contractor in the world.183 Boeing’s Defense, Space & Security
division was responsible for fifty-one percent of the company’s income in 2008.184
Attaching liability to Boeing for conduct merely resembling a breach of contract or
negligence would have disastrous implications.
Potentially, the government may lose one of its most important contractors. In
addition, putting Boeing’s defense division under could result in massive job loss.
Furthermore, the loss of its defense division, because of its value to the company,
would have a substantial impact on Boeing’s other divisions. Given FERA’s
economic-driven purpose,185 job loss of this magnitude is manifestly undesirable.
Thus, narrowing the FCA’s focus to exclude negligence or mistake will better serve
FERA’s economic agenda.
Further compounding the issue is the burden the increase in liability will
necessarily place on federal court dockets. Even before FERA, “[t]he sheer number
of potential parties to FCA liability has already increased with the passage of the
economic stimulus bills.”186 After the FERA amendments widened the scale of
181
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liability, “the potential exists for almost any business or company to be liable under
the FCA.”187 In combining these amendments with “the other FERA amendments
that provide for expanded protection available to whistleblowers and qui tam
relators, the potential is great for a flood of FCA litigation.”188
IV. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: A POTENT, YET MORE
EFFICIENT WEAPON TO COMBAT FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
Instead of providing for clarification, the FERA’s amendments to the FCA –
specifically its removal of the “intent” requirement and expansion of the reverse
false claims provision – ensure a broadened scope of liability for private entities that
conduct business with the government, whether directly or indirectly. In an attempt
to remedy the loopholes recent Supreme Court decisions have created for
contractors, Congress has instead created loopholes for relators and whistleblowers.
Moreover, a law that was initially designed to punish those who intentionally
defraud the Government now appears to employ a quasi-negligence standard.
Consequently, the FERA amendments to the FCA will expose organizations that use
government funds to unwarranted liability.
Congress should again amend the False Claims Act. This time, however, the
legislation should expressly exclude mere negligence as a basis for liability. Several
state legislatures have included such language into their state versions of the False
Claims Act.189 Minnesota, for example, does not attach liability to “a person who
acts merely negligently, inadvertently, or mistakenly.”190 Florida excludes “innocent
mistake[s]” from the Act’s ambit of reprimand.191 Amending the FCA to exclude
negligence and mistake as bases for liability is consistent with Congress’s goal “to
protect from fraud the Federal assistance and relief funds expended in response to
our current economic crisis.”192 Moreover, this amendment would prevent the FCA
from attaching liability to parties lacking the requisite scienter, such as Reliable
Rubber, Mayo Foundation, Dr. Chen, and even Boeing. For these innocent, although
negligent parties, recourse lies in a simple claim of negligence or breach of contract.
In turn, the government’s effort will be more focused on those who need deterring.
Similarly, Congress could effectuate its purpose by amending the language of the
FCA to attach liability to conduct done in “bad faith.” Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “bad faith” as “dishonesty of belief or purpose.”193 Pursuant to this
187
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definition, courts may find entities liable when the entity has presented a false claim
or obtained government funds with a dishonest belief or purpose. Here, too,
Congress would ensure that courts attach liability to deserving corporate entities,
without unfairly penalizing parties who merely act unreasonably in their compliance
procedures or in filing claims. After all, these are not the parties that need deterring.
V. CONCLUSION
The Civil False Claims Act was not intended to remedy every wrong that a
government contractor may commit.194 The FCA and its extreme penalties were
designed to deter a specific category of offenders: those who knowingly,
deceptively, and wrongfully defraud the government. If left unchanged, the FCA’s
imprecise language will result in courts applying a negligence standard. If the
FCA’s threshold for liability were to erode to a negligence standard, the cost of
doing business with the government and contractors would necessarily rise.
Furthermore, the number of people willing to do business with the government
would dwindle. Congress must take heed of the states, and expressly exclude
negligence and mere mistake as bases for liability under the federal False Claims
Act.

194

132 CONG. REC. S11244 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1986) (statement of Sen. Grassley)
(Senator Grassley stated that Congress’s “intent in returning to the reckless disregard standard
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not require any proof of an intentional, deliberate, or willful act.”).
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